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ABSTRACT: This paper examines how the external information environment in which foreign 
subsidiaries operate affects the investment decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs). We 
hypothesize and find that the investment decisions of foreign subsidiaries in country-industries 
with more transparent information environments are more responsive to local growth 
opportunities than are those of foreign subsidiaries in country-industries with less transparent 
information environments. Further, this effect is larger when (i) there are greater cross-border 
frictions between the parent and subsidiary, and (ii) the parents are relatively more involved in 
their subsidiaries’ investment decision-making process. Our results suggest that the external 
information environment helps mitigate the agency problems that arise when firms expand their 
operations across borders. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the external 
information environment helps MNCs mitigate information frictions within the firm. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies the role of the information environment in helping multinational 
corporations (MNCs) monitor and evaluate their subsidiaries’ investment decisions. 1  Prior 
research emphasizes that cross-border frictions increase information asymmetry between parents 
and their subsidiaries, which increases the cost of monitoring within MNCs. For example, cross-
border frictions such as geographic and cultural differences make it difficult for parents to 
incentivize the subsidiary managers and to evaluate their actions (Roth and O'Donnell 1996). As 
a result, prior studies find that MNCs adjust their ownership structure, compensation contracts, 
and organizational design to mitigate these frictions (Desai et al. 2004; Antras et al. 2009; Siegel 
and Larson 2009). Despite empirical evidence of such “internal mechanisms” intended to 
mitigate cross-border frictions, substantial cross-sectional variation still exists in the efficiency of 
MNCs (Caves 2007), suggesting that these internal solutions are unlikely to fully resolve all 
information problems. Our paper builds on this literature by examining whether the external 
information environment serves as another mechanism for parents to monitor their subsidiaries’ 
decisions and to deal with the information frictions within the firm. 
The intuition for our hypothesis is that external information, such as that generated by 
other firms in the industry or by capital market participants, can be used to evaluate managerial 
actions. For example, Holmstrom (1979) shows that information disclosed by competitors and 
other related firms can be used to benchmark managers in relative performance compensation 
contracts. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) show that external information aggregated in stock 
prices can be used as a monitoring mechanism to reduce agency problems, which can affect firm 
performance. Similarly, Bushman and Smith (2001) and Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss several 
cases in which external information is used to facilitate internal governance mechanisms that 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we use the terms “MNCs” and “parents” interchangeably. 
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monitor and evaluate managers. Here again, the intuition is that external information 
complements internal governance systems when resolving agency problems. 
We use the insights developed in the above literatures to study the role the external 
information environment plays in helping MNCs monitor a foreign subsidiary’s investment 
decisions. We focus on investment because it is one of the most important managerial actions 
and the decision is observable. The external information environment refers to the quality and 
quantity of information produced by related firms, such as competitors and supply chain partners, 
and by information intermediaries, such as analysts and the business press, in the environment in 
which the subsidiary operates. The basic idea is that MNCs can use the information available in 
the subsidiary’s operating environment to forecast product demand, evaluate the extent of 
competition, analyze the profitability and investment plans of direct competitors, etc. This 
information can then be used by MNCs to monitor and evaluate the subsidiary’s investment 
decisions. As a result, we hypothesize that the investment decisions of subsidiaries located in 
rich information environments are more efficient than those of subsidiaries located in poor 
information environments.  An implicit assumption underlying our prediction is that parents are 
involved in their subsidiaries’ decision making process either directly by participating in the 
decision process or indirectly by monitoring and evaluating their decisions. We explore this 
assumption in greater detail in our cross-sectional tests described below. 
Our analyses exploit a novel dataset provided by ORBIS, which contains detailed 
information on the ownership structure of subsidiaries within MNCs. Our sample consists of 
6,298 unique foreign subsidiaries with 2,249 parent firms operating in 63 countries from 2000 to 
2009, yielding 32,163 subsidiary-year observations. Following Wurgler (2000), Bekaert et al. 
(2007), and Badertscher et al. (2013), we focus on the sensitivity of a subsidiary’s investment to 
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its growth opportunities. Prior research interprets a higher sensitivity as more desirable based on 
the idea that investment is more responsive to growth opportunities when the adjustment costs, 
such as information frictions and agency problems, are low (Hubbard 1998). We use asset 
growth as a proxy for investment and the price-to-earnings (PE) ratio measured at the country-
industry level as a proxy for growth opportunities (Bekaert et al. 2007). Finally, to proxy for the 
quality of the external information environment, we use the median analyst coverage, press 
coverage, and the degree of earnings transparency by firms in the country-industry in which the 
subsidiary operates. These measures are extensively used as proxies for the quality of the 
information environment in prior research (Beyer et al. 2010). We compute these measures at the 
country-industry-year level to capture the external information environment. By examining the 
quality of the external information environment, rather than the subsidiaries’ own financial 
reporting and disclosure quality, we mitigate the concern that the information environment and 
subsidiary investment are endogenously determined. 
Our main specification is a subsidiary-level regression of investment on growth 
opportunities and an interaction between growth opportunities and the quality of the external 
information environment. While widely used in prior research (Hubbard 1998; Bekaert et al. 
2007), this model potentially suffers from a misspecification if there is measurement error in our 
proxy for growth opportunity and the measurement error systematically varies with the external 
information environment. To mitigate this concern, we include an extensive set of control 
variables. Specifically, we control for differences in the sensitivity of investment to growth 
opportunities across countries by including country fixed effects and an interaction between each 
country fixed effect and growth opportunities. As a result, our identification comes from cross-
industry and time variation in the information environment within each country. We also include 
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parent-subsidiary country-pair fixed effects to control for bilateral relationships between the 
parent’s and subsidiary’s countries (Dellestrand and Kappen 2012), MNC fixed effects to control 
for differences in investment policies across MNCs (Desai et al. 2009), and controls for other 
internal mechanisms that mitigate agency problems within the firm, including the parent’s 
ownership structure, internal capital markets, and reliance on domestic banking credit. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the sensitivity of subsidiary investment to 
growth opportunities is higher in country-industries with richer information environments. In 
economic terms, we find a 3% difference in investment between firms in rich and poor 
information environments for a one standard deviation change in growth opportunities. Given 
that the average investment in our sample is 18%,2  this represents a relative difference of 
approximately 17%. These results provide initial support for our hypothesis that the information 
environment helps MNCs monitor and evaluate their subsidiaries’ investment decisions. 
Next, we perform two cross-sectional tests. First, our earlier findings suggest that the 
local information environment facilitates monitoring and ultimately mitigates cross-border 
frictions. To strengthen this result, we predict and find that the value of local information 
environment is greater when there are greater cross-border frictions between the parent and 
subsidiary, for example, when the parent and the subsidiary are located in countries that speak 
different languages. Second, a key assumption underlying our main hypothesis is that the parents 
are involved in and actively monitor their subsidiaries’ investment decision. However, MNCs 
vary in the degree to which investment decisions are made by managers from the parent firms 
and, as a result, the external information environment could have a differential role depending on 
the parent’s involvement in the decision making process. We explore this argument and find that 
our results are stronger when the parent is more involved in the subsidiary’s investment 
                                                 
2  Average investment is measured as the average asset growth for all subsidiaries in our sample (see Table 3). 
5 
 
decisions, for example, when management team of the subsidiary is composed of a greater 
number of expatriates from the parent’s country. 
An important benefit of our cross-sectional test is that it exploits variation in the parent’s 
location while holding the subsidiary’s location constant. That is, we effectively compare the 
investment behavior of two subsidiaries located in the same country but vary in the levels of 
frictions between the parent and subsidiary. As a result, these tests further alleviate any concerns 
related to cross-country differences in the subsidiary’s investing/institutional environment and 
measurement error in our proxies. This enhances the empirical identification of our inferences. 
Finally, we perform a battery of sensitivity tests to verify the validity of our inferences. 
First, we use the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as a proxy for a 
time-series change in the quality of the external information environment (Barth et al. 2008) and 
find that the sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities increases for subsidiaries located 
in IFRS adopting countries following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. In addition, we repeat our 
analyses using total factor productivity as an alternative proxy for investment efficiency (Schoar 
2002; Giroud 2013). Finally, in the spirit of a difference-in-difference research design, we 
benchmark our results for foreign subsidiaries to those for domestic subsidiaries as well as to the 
results for local standalone firms operating in the same country as the foreign subsidiary because 
these benchmark firms do not face cross-border frictions. We find that our inferences are 
unaffected by these additional tests.  
Two important caveats regarding our dataset should be noted. First, the ORBIS dataset 
exhibits significant cross-country variation in subsidiary coverage, primarily due to cross-
country differences in the reporting requirements for private firms. As a result, subsidiaries in 
some countries are under-represented in our sample. In addition, ownership information in 
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ORBIS is a stale variable, meaning that it is coded as of the latest year in the dataset. This 
potentially creates measurement error in our parent-subsidiary classification. We partially 
mitigate the influence of these database issues through our research design and sensitivity tests. 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that such limitations of the ORBIS dataset may affect the 
generalizability of our findings. 
Our paper is related to several streams of literature. First, it relates to both, the financial 
and managerial accounting literatures. A recent stream of papers in financial accounting 
investigates how information quality affects corporate investment decisions (Hope and Thomas 
2008; Biddle et al. 2009; Durnev and Mangen 2009; Chen et al. 2011; Badertscher et al. 2013). 
A separate stream of research in managerial accounting examines the role of internal control 
systems, such as incentive contracts and cost accounting systems, designed to facilitate 
managerial decision making and reduce agency costs (Anthony 1965; Bruns and Waterhouse 
1975; Datar et al. 2013). For example, Chenhall (2003) illustrates how the type of internal 
controls systems used in a firm largely depends on the firm’s external environment. Our paper 
links these two literatures by investigating how the external information environment can serve 
as a control system that reduces information frictions within MNCs. 
Second, our study also contributes to the literature in economics and international 
business. Prior studies examine how firms deal with agency frictions when operating across 
borders and find that MNCs adjust their ownership structure, compensation contracts, and 
organizational design to mitigate these frictions (Zaheer 1995; Smith 2001; Desai et al. 2004; 
Antras et al. 2009; Siegel and Larson 2009). We extend this literature by exploring a unique 
dataset on subsidiary-level investment decisions by MNCs around the world. MNCs are an 
increasingly common organizational form and yet we know little about the factors driving their 
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investment decisions, in particular, the role of the external information environment in 
facilitating their investment. This is particularly important because MNCs face substantial cross-
border frictions and the role of the information environment in resolving such frictions is 
potentially large. Our results suggest that the external information environment helps mitigate 
the agency problems that arise when firms expand their operations across borders. 
II. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
Information Frictions within MNCs 
The importance of information frictions within MNCs (and within multi-segment firms 
generally defined) becomes readily apparent when parents and subsidiaries are viewed within a 
principal-agent framework. Parent firms allocate resources across subsidiaries and therefore face 
the need to monitor their activities. However, increased information frictions and moral hazard 
within firms make resource allocation challenging for the parent (Stein 1997; Hope and Thomas 
2008; Graham et al. 2011). For example, information frictions can arise within multi-segment 
firms due to conflicting operational styles or corporate cultures across segments (Bushman et al. 
2004). Further, unlike single segment firms, in multi-segment firms the individual business 
segments are shielded from takeover pressures (Cusatis et al. 1993) and divisional managers are 
less likely to receive powerful equity incentives (Schipper and Smith 1986) leading to an 
increase in moral hazard. 
The severity of such moral hazard and information frictions in multi-segment firms is 
likely to be exacerbated in MNCs as compared to domestic firms. Specifically, MNCs face cross-
border frictions arising from geographic dispersion, cultural and language differences, differing 
legal systems, etc., which make it more difficult to monitor and/or incentivize divisional 
managers (Hamilton and Kashlak 1999; Mian 2006; Bell et al. 2012; Dellestrand and Kappen 
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2012). In response to these information frictions, prior studies show that MNCs seek to reduce 
the costs of monitoring subsidiaries by reallocating decision rights (Desai et al. 2004), sharing 
ownership with local partners (Antras et al. 2009), and improving information technology 
systems (Bloom et al. 2012). However, despite these internal mechanisms, there is still evidence 
of substantial cross-sectional variation in the efficiency of decision-making within MNCs (Caves 
2007). For example, Mian (2006) shows that the foreign branches of multinational banks are less 
likely to lend to small, albeit fundamentally solvent, businesses because the profitability of such 
loans is difficult for foreign branches to communicate to the parent banks. We build on this line 
of research, but with an important distinction. In contrast to prior studies that focus on internal 
mechanisms, we investigate whether external sources, specifically the degree of transparency in 
the information environment in which the subsidiary operates, help MNCs monitor their 
subsidiaries’ decisions and mitigate information frictions within the firm. 
The Role of the External Information Environment 
The idea that the external information environment provides information about firm 
performance dates back to the literature on relative performance evaluation. Holmstrom (1979) 
shows that external information from competitors can be used to benchmark managerial 
performance and improve compensation contracts.3 Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) show that 
external information aggregated in stock price can be used as a monitoring mechanism to reduce 
agency problems and improve firm performance. We build on this literature by developing 
predictions about the role of the external information environment in monitoring managers’ 
investment decisions. We focus on investment decisions because it is one of the most important 
managerial decisions and one of the most fundamental drivers of firm value (Hubbard 1998). 
                                                 
3 More broadly, the literature on information transfer shows that competitors’ disclosure activities affect investors’ 
perceptions about related firms (Foster 1981).  
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Prior studies argue that better information can improve investment because it allows 
shareholders to better monitor managerial actions (Bushman and Smith 2001; Chen et al. 2007). 
Further, recent papers show that information about one firm can affect competitors' investments. 
Durnev and Mangen (2009) and Kedia and Philippon (2009) present evidence that a firm’s 
misreporting activities, proxied by accounting restatements and fraud, can lead to sub-optimal 
investment by competitors due to their reliance on erroneous information. Sidak (2003) presents 
similar arguments by arguing that WorldCom’s fraudulent disclosure and financial reports had 
negative real effects on other telecom firms, governments, and capital markets.4  
We hypothesize that the information environment in which the foreign subsidiary 
operates, defined as the quantity and quality of information disclosed by peer firms and 
information intermediaries, can help MNCs monitor a subsidiary’s investment decisions. This 
occurs because parents can gain insights about managerial actions by observing external 
information. For example, they can use external information to forecast the demand in the 
subsidiary’s line of business, the extent of competition, and the profitability and investment 
outlays of direct competitors, all of which can be used to benchmark the actions and performance 
of subsidiary managers. In other words, a rich external information environment enables parents 
to better evaluate whether its subsidiary’s investments are in line with the subsidiary’s growth 
opportunities. This could then mitigate subsidiary managers’ incentives to shirk and/or divert 
resources to seek private gain, leading us to our first hypothesis: 
H1: The sensitivity of investment to local growth opportunities is higher for subsidiaries 
operating in more transparent information environments. 
 
While we focus on the potential role played by the external information environment in 
resolving information frictions within MNCs and facilitating monitoring, an alternative 
                                                 
4  Sidak (2003) finds that WorldCom’s falsified reports and disclosures led to: (i) overinvestment in network 
capacity, (ii) the formulation of flawed government telecommunication policies, and (iii) the sustained retrenchment 
of financing sources away from future telecom investment projects.  Also see Li (2012), Badertscher et al. (2013) 
and Beatty et al. (2013). 
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hypothesis is that MNCs monitor subsidiary managers through other mechanisms. For example, 
Antras et al. (2009) find that MNCs often enter foreign markets through a wholly owned 
subsidiary when there is higher risk of misappropriation by the foreign subsidiary. If other 
mechanisms, such as ownership interest, allow MNCs to completely resolve the information 
frictions between the parent and subsidiary in a cost effective manner, then the information 
environment would have little role to play in facilitating subsidiaries’ investment decisions. 
Ultimately, it is an empirical question as to whether the external information environment 
facilitates monitoring within MNCs. 
Cross-Sectional Predictions 
In this section, we develop two predictions based on cross-sectional differences in the 
extent to which the external information environment facilitates subsidiaries’ investment 
decisions. First, we hypothesize that the role of the external information environment in 
facilitating a subsidiary’s investment decision is greater when there are greater cross-border 
frictions between the parent and subsidiary. The idea is that when cross-border frictions are high, 
such as when the parent and the subsidiary are geographically distant, the external information 
environment can play a greater role in disciplining subsidiary managers by providing parent 
firms with information about the local economic environment. This occurs because the value of 
external information that can be obtained from the local information environment, such as 
performance benchmarks and local investment opportunities, is relatively more important when 
the parent firm is more uncertain about the growth opportunities available to the subsidiary. In 
contrast, when cross-border frictions are low, the costs of exchanging information between 
parents and subsidiaries are similarly low, which likely results in greater information transfers 
from the subsidiary to the parent and vice versa (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Di Giovanni 
2005; Giroud 2013). Such information sharing allows the parent to better evaluate the context 
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within which their subsidiary managers make their investment decisions with lesser reliance on 
the external information environment.5 The above discussion leads to our next hypothesis. 
H2: The effect of the information environment on the sensitivity of investment to growth 
opportunities is greater when there are greater cross-border frictions between the parent and 
subsidiary. 
 
Our second cross-sectional prediction is based on the allocation of investment decision-
making rights between parents and subsidiaries. An important assumption in our main hypothesis 
is that the parents are involved in their subsidiaries’ decision-making process. As a result, parents 
use the information available in their subsidiaries’ operating environment to evaluate and 
monitor their investment decisions. However, prior research finds that some parents delegate 
their decision-making rights to subsidiary managers and design incentive schemes to align the 
subsidiary’s interests with their own (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989; Ittner and Larcker 2001). In 
such a scenario, the external information environment is likely to play a relatively smaller role in 
helping parents monitor their subsidiaries, at least with respect to investment decisions.6 Based 
on the above argument, we hypothesize that the external information environment will be 
relatively more important in facilitating the subsidiary’s investment decisions when the parent is 
more involved in the subsidiary’s investment decision-making process. 
H3: The effect of the information environment on the sensitivity of investment to growth 
opportunities is stronger when parents are more involved in the subsidiary’s investment 
decision-making process. 
 
Implicit in the development of the preceding two hypotheses is that the extent of cross-
border frictions (H2) and the allocation of the investment decision rights (H3) are independent of 
each other. However, it is plausible that cross-border frictions affect the allocation of decision-
                                                 
5 Note that if alternative internal mechanisms, such as ownership interest and the allocation of decision rights, fully 
resolve cross-border frictions within MNCs, we would expect a null result for H2. 
6 The alternative hypothesis is that the external information environment could still be used by the parent to 
incentivize the manager, e.g., through relative performance evaluation contracts. To the extent that such incentive 
mechanisms lead to more efficient investment, we would expect a null result for our third hypothesis.  
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making rights.7 In untabulated analyses, we find that the correlation between these constructs is 
small in magnitude (ranging from -0.001 to 0.184). Further, our inferences are unchanged when 
we control for decision-making rights in our test of cross-border frictions and vice versa. 
However, for the ease of exposition and to make our empirical models more tractable, we 
examine these hypotheses independently. 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
Data 
We use the ORBIS database published by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), which includes 
ownership and financial information about public and private firms worldwide. BvD compiles 
information on public and private firms directly from annual reports and other well-established 
national data providers.8 We collect financial data for parents and subsidiaries from the 2010 
CDs of the BvD industrial financial database. The majority of the subsidiaries report their 
financials using local accounting standards and approximately two percent of our sample firms 
report under IFRS. In addition to financial information, ORBIS provides additional firm-level 
information, including management and board member characteristics, industry classification, 
and country of domicile. A limitation of the ORBIS database is cross-country variation in 
subsidiary coverage due to the differences in the reporting requirements across countries.9 As a 
                                                 
7 For example, parent firms could retain greater control of the decision process when cross-border frictions are high, 
in an attempt to reduce agency costs. Alternatively, it is plausible that parent firms delegate decision-making rights 
to local managers when cross-border frictions are high to better exploit their knowledge of local growth 
opportunities in the subsidiary’s country (i.e., there might be greater demand for local expertise). 
8 The providers include World’Vest Base (WVB) and six regional data providers: Edgar Online (USA), Huaxia 
International Business credit consulting company (China), Korea Information Service (Korea), Teikoku Databank 
(Japan), Reuters (USA), and Thompson Financial. 
9 For example, in most European countries, both public and private companies are required to disclose annual 
financial data, while in North America only public firms are required to provide such information. As most 
subsidiaries are privately owned, North American subsidiaries are under-represented in the ORBIS database. Even 
within Europe there is cross-country variation in the reporting requirements of private firms. In some countries (e.g., 
Russia, Switzerland, and Ukraine), private firms are not required to provide financial information. In countries like 
Austria, private firms are required to provide only a few basic financial items. 
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result, subsidiaries in some countries are under-represented in our sample. We address this 
limitation by studying within-country variation in subsidiary investment as we describe later. 
We first construct the business group structure of MNCs by linking subsidiaries to 
parents using the BvD ownership database as illustrated in the appendix. We define the ultimate 
parents as firms in which no single corporate shareholder owns more than 25% of the firms’ 
shares, following the guidance in the ORBIS manual. Subsidiaries include firms both directly 
owned by the parent (Level 1) and subsidiaries indirectly owned via ownership of other 
subsidiaries (Levels 2, 3, and 4). We exclude subsidiaries with missing information on 
immediate ownership. This step reduces concerns about double-counting subsidiaries that appear 
multiple times at different ownership levels. We classify a business group as an MNC if it 
directly holds at least one subsidiary operating in a foreign country.10 
We use all available data, subject to some minimal constraints. First, we exclude 
subsidiaries that are financial holding companies because they are less likely to invest in physical 
assets. We drop subsidiaries that lack the data to compute the growth opportunity measure that 
we describe below and subsidiaries with limited financial information in their unconsolidated 
financial statements.11 All parents and subsidiaries are required to have at least USD 10,000 in 
assets and sales to minimize outliers in computation of sales and asset growth. This leaves us 
                                                 
10 One important limitation of the ORBIS database is that the ownership structure could be stale. That is, ORBIS 
only reports subsidiary information as of the database’s most recent update. For example, if an MNC has no 
subsidiary in India before 2010, the most recent year in the database, but in 2010 it acquired an Indian firm that 
existed prior to 2010, we would erroneously treat the MNC as owning the Indian subsidiary for all years in our 
sample. Likewise, if a company had a subsidiary in India for the length of our sample but liquidated it in 2009, we 
would erroneously treat the MNC as not owning a subsidiary in India for all years in our sample. To assess whether 
this limitation affects our results, we follow Markle and Shackelford (2010) and select the last three years for which 
we have data as the cut-off for our sensitivity tests. The intuition is that because subsidiary ownership is likely to be 
sticky, there are likely to be fewer errors in the years immediately preceding 2010 than there would be earlier. In 
untabulated results, we find the coefficient for the interaction between PE and IE is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that our inferences are not significantly affected by this limitation. 
11 An exception is that when subsidiaries hold other Level 2 and 3 subsidiaries, we use the consolidated financial 
statements when the unconsolidated statements are not available. Due to this restriction, many subsidiaries in North 
America are excluded from our analysis. 
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with a sample of 65,922 parent-subsidiary-year observations. We then initially exclude domestic 
subsidiaries where cross-border frictions are absent but later use these domestic subsidiaries as a 
benchmark sample in Section V. These restrictions yield a sample of 32,163 parent-subsidiary-
year observations from 2000 to 2009. Our final sample consists of 2,249 parents and 6,298 
foreign subsidiaries spanning 63 countries. Table 1 describes our sample selection process. 
Table 2, Panel A shows the distribution of parents and subsidiaries by country. The 
distribution is unbalanced for both parent and subsidiary firms. For example, the United States is 
home to many parents but not many subsidiaries. Belgium, in contrast, has far more subsidiaries 
than parents, and Germany shows a high concentration of both parents and subsidiaries. Panel B 
shows the geographic distribution of subsidiaries by parent region. In other words, the table is 
structured so that each row (i.e., each parent region) adds up to 100%. A large proportion of 
parents are located in North America, with some significant representation in East Asia and 
Western Europe, while the majority of subsidiaries are located in Eastern and Western Europe. 
Among European parents, the high percentage in the diagonal of the matrix indicates that most 
subsidiaries are established within the parent’s region. This suggests that the preference for 
geographically proximate investments, which is well-documented in the equity home bias 
literature (Portes and Rey 2005), is also observed in our MNC sample. However, there is still 
substantial variation in subsidiary location. For example, for parents from South American 
countries, 10.6% of their foreign subsidiaries are in South America, 17.0% in North America, 
and 50.3% in Western Europe.  
Research Design 
Our main prediction is that the external information environments in which subsidiaries 
operate enable parents to better monitor their subsidiary’s actions, which affects the subsidiary’s 
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investment decisions. To test this prediction, we examine whether the sensitivity of a 
subsidiary’s investment to its growth opportunities is affected by its information environment. 
Prior research interprets this sensitivity as a desirable feature of investment (Bekaert et al. 2007; 
Bushman et al. 2011; Badertscher et al. 2013). The intuition is that investment is more 
responsive to investment opportunities when the adjustment costs are low (Hubbard 1998).12 
To test our prediction, we estimate the following regression model using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with subsidiaries indexed as i, parents as m, parents’ countries as p, subsidiaries’ 
countries as s, subsidiaries’ industries as j and each year in the sample as t. 
INVi,t = β PEs,j,t × IEs,j,t + Σ βs PEs,j,t × Countrys + Σ βk PEs,j,t × Internalk + Σ αm MNCm + Σ αp,s 
Countryp,s + Σ αj Industryj + Σ αk Internalk + Controls + εi,t ,         (1) 
 
where INV is a firm-level proxy for the subsidiary’s investment, PE is the price-to-earnings ratio 
used as a proxy for the subsidiary’s growth opportunities, IE is a proxy for the transparency of 
the external information environment, Internalk is a set of internal mechanisms, Controls is a set 
of control variables associated with investment, MNCm are fixed effects for each parent firm, 
Countryp,s are parent-subsidiary country-pair fixed effects, and Industryj are industry fixed 
effects. The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the incremental sensitivity of investment 
to growth opportunities (INV–PE) in more transparent information environments. Our prediction 
is that subsidiaries in more transparent environments exhibit greater INV–PE sensitivity than 
subsidiaries in less transparent environments, consistent with H1: β > 0. 
The three main variables in equation (1) are investment, growth opportunities, and the 
information environment, discussed in the next section. Ideally, we would proxy for investment 
using capital expenditures and/or acquisitions. However, these data are not available for our 
                                                 
12 Adjustment costs arise from information frictions such as adverse selection and moral hazard, among other things, 
leading to too little investment in growing projects and too much investment in declining projects. When adjustment 
costs are low, investment is more efficient because firms can more rapidly increase (decrease) investment in 
growing (declining) businesses/industries. 
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sample of largely private subsidiaries. Thus, we proxy for subsidiary investment using the 
percentage change in total assets in a year (Badertscher et al. 2013). Following Bekaert et al. 
(2007), we use the price-to-earnings (PE) ratio of the country-industry-year in which the 
subsidiary operates as our proxy for growth opportunities.13,14 Bekaert et al. (2007) point out that 
an advantage of using the industry PE ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities is that this 
measure is relatively exogenous to an individual firm’s investment choices. We obtain monthly 
PE ratios from Datastream and annualize them using the median ratio in the calendar year. 
Equation (1) includes a series of fixed effects intended to capture unobservable 
characteristics that affect subsidiary investment. First, because our coefficient of interest is the 
sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities, we include a series of interactions that could 
affect this relation. Specifically, in equation (1), we allow the coefficient for PEs,j,t to vary by 
country by interacting PEs,j,t with indicator variables for each country where the subsidiary is 
located, yielding one estimated β for each country ‘s.’ This is important because prior research 
finds that country-level institutional features, such as financial development and capital market 
integration, lead to differences in investment efficiency (Wurgler 2000; Bekaert et al. 2007). By 
including interaction terms between PE and country indicators, we control for the effect of 
country-level factors on investment efficiency. Further, measurement error in the PE ratio across 
countries could lead to biases in our inferences to the extent that the measurement error is 
correlated with differences in the information environment across countries (Erickson and 
Whited 2000). By allowing INV–PE sensitivities to vary by country, we effectively control for 
                                                 
13 An alternative is to measure the PE ratio for each subsidiary. However, because most subsidiaries in our sample 
are not publicly traded, we are unable to measure subsidiary-specific PE ratios. 
14 PE ratios can be interpreted as the price paid for a dollar of the firm’s current earnings. Thus, when the riskiness 
of the earnings stream, accounting practices, the degree of market efficiency, etc., are held constant, the differences 
in PE ratios are likely to capture differences in available growth opportunities (Bekaert et al. 2007). 
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cross-country differences in measurement error in PE across countries and identify our effect of 
interest from within-country variation in the information environment. 
Second, we control for a series of mechanisms that could affect investment and/or be 
used to monitor a subsidiary’s decisions (labeled ‘Internal’ and ‘PE × Internal’). Specifically, 
we control for the parent firm’s cash flow, because prior research finds that parent cash flows 
affect subsidiary investment through internal capital markets (Shin and Stulz 1998).15 We also 
control for the parent’s ownership interest in the subsidiary because prior research finds that 
MNCs adjust their ownership to mitigate incentive problems between the parent and subsidiary 
(Antras et al. 2009).16 Finally, we control for the availability of local bank financing to control 
for additional bank monitoring that can affect the subsidiary’s investment decisions. As ORBIS 
has very limited data on an individual subsidiary’s bank loans, we use the total banking credit 
extended in the subsidiary’s country (Domestic Banking Credit) to proxy for bank monitoring.  
Domestic Banking Credit is measured as the sum of all credit provided by the banking sector as a 
percentage of GDP. Finally, we note that although data limitations preclude us from directly 
controlling for all possible internal mechanisms, controlling for the interaction between PE and 
country indicators (discussed above) allows us to indirectly control for them as long as these 
mechanisms are largely driven by country-level factors.17 
                                                 
15 We use the cash flows obtained for the parent’s consolidated financial statement as we do not have the financial 
statements on a parent-only basis.  
16 Prior literature finds that the parent ownership percentage does not always reflect the control rights of the parent 
firm over the subsidiary, especially when MNCs are structured as family-controlled business groups (Claessens et al. 
2000). In untabulated analysis, we use 1) the position of each firm in the group, reflecting the number of firms that 
exist between the parent and subsidiary and 2) cash flow rights, measured as the sum of the minimum percentage 
ownership linking the parent and the subsidiary (La Porta et al. 1999) as alternative measures of control rights. 
Using these alternative measures of control rights yields similar inferences. Note that throughout the draft, the 
phrase “similar inferences” indicates that our results are statistically significant at the 10% level of better and the 
coefficients are of the same sign and similar magnitudes. 
17 For example, Antras et al. (2009) and Robinson and Stocken (2013) find that country-level factors such as 
investor protection and financial development influence a number of MNC characteristics such as ownership (e.g., 
joint venture vs. wholly owned subsidiaries), capital structure, organizational design (e.g., centralized vs. 
decentralized management), etc. 
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We also control for a series of fixed effects that directly influence investment. First, we 
include indicator variables for each parent firm. This allows us to account for unobserved factors 
that affect investment decisions at the parent-firm level. For example, one could argue that 
certain MNCs are simply more successful in exploiting growth opportunities and that our results 
could reflect their preference for operating in more transparent environments. Including these 
indicator variables restricts the variation in subsidiary investment to within the MNC, thereby 
controlling for unobservable MNC-level factors that might affect investment. 
Second, it is plausible that subsidiary investment is driven by the characteristics of the 
subsidiary’s country relative to the parent’s country, including differences in corporate tax rate, 
property rights, etc. For example, the U.S. offers much stronger property rights protection 
relative to India, which may cause Indian MNCs to conduct their R&D operations via 
subsidiaries located in the U.S. To control for such relative differences in country characteristics 
that might affect investment, we include indicator variables for each parent-subsidiary country-
pair in our regressions. Third, we include industry fixed effects to capture differences in the 
industry characteristics of each subsidiary, such as production adjustment costs, that could affect 
investment. Finally, our set of Controls includes the subsidiary firm size (log of total assets) and 
performance (ROA) to control for subsidiary scale and profitability. 
The External Information Environment 
We use three proxies for the transparency of the external information environment (IE) 
based on (i) the amount of information produced by financial analysts, (ii) the amount of 
information produced by the business press, and (iii) the extent of earnings management by 
related firms.18 A notable feature is that these proxies are computed at the aggregate country-
                                                 
18 Our proxies for the information environment assume that increasing the quantity of information weakly increases 
information quality as investors and market participants can always ignore any additional information that is not 
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industry level to capture the external information environment, making them exogenous to a 
subsidiary’s investment decisions.  
Analyst Coverage: Our first measure of the quality of the information environment is the 
number of analysts following the firms in each country-industry-year. Financial analysts collect, 
process, and disseminate information about firm performance and future outlook (Beyer et al. 
2010; De Franco and Hope 2011). Prior research suggests that greater analyst coverage is related 
to higher reporting transparency (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Hope 2003; Lang et al. 2004), lower 
information uncertainty (Zhang 2006), and greater industry-wide information transfer (Piotroski 
and Roulstone 2004). The role of financial analysts as information intermediaries has been 
recognized in fields outside of accounting. For example, in the international business literature, 
Bell et al. (2012) suggest that financial analysts can help alleviate the cross border frictions for 
firms operating in a foreign country. 
We compute analyst following as the number of analysts following the firm. Firms 
without coverage in I/B/E/S are assumed to have no analyst coverage.19 We then compute the 
median number of analysts following the firms in each country-industry-year. We use the 
quartile rank of the country-industry analyst coverage every year as our first measure of IE.20 
Press Coverage: Our second proxy for the quality of the external information 
environment is the amount of press coverage received by firms in a country-industry-year. Prior 
                                                                                                                                                             
relevant to them. This assumption is in line with prior disclosure theories. For example, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000, 
91) note that, “the theory is sufficiently broad as to allow the notion of ‘increased levels of disclosure’ to be 
interpreted as either an increase in the quantity of disclosure or an increase in the quality of disclosure (or both).” 
19 We note that differences in I/B/E/S coverage across countries could affect the validity of this assumption. For 
example, in 2005, 28% (49%) of firms in Australia (Austria) have at least one analyst according to I/B/E/S. 
However, we do not know if the remaining firms missing coverage in I/B/E/S represent zero analyst coverage or 
I/B/E/S data biases. To reduce the possibility that our inferences are affected by such country-specific biases, we 
include country fixed effects in our regression specification so that we make inferences from within-country 
variations in investment. 
20 We use quartile ranks to reduce the measurement error in the information environment proxies and to ease 
interpretation. However, our inferences remain unchanged when we use a continuous version of our information 
environment proxies. 
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research finds that the pressure created by press coverage can play an important role in 
monitoring and disciplining firms. For example, Dyck et al. (2008) find that press coverage 
affects the amount of corporate resources that are diverted to the sole advantage of the 
controlling shareholders. Miller (2006) finds that the press plays an important monitoring role by 
identifying accounting irregularities and by publicizing irregularities identified by other 
information intermediaries. Collectively, the evidence from prior research suggests that press 
coverage helps improve firms’ information environments by identifying and disseminating a 
variety of corporate governance issues. 
We use a large proprietary dataset of press coverage received by more than 28,000 firms 
over more than 11 years and 86 different countries, compiled by RavenPack. RavenPack collects 
this extensive dataset from different press sources, including news wires, disclosures to 
regulators, credit rating agencies, etc. We compute press coverage as the median number of 
articles about a firm in each country-industry-year. We use the quartile rank of the country-
industry press coverage each year as our second measure of IE.21 
Earnings Transparency: Our final measure of the quality of the information environment 
is the degree of earnings transparency by firms in each country-industry. The idea is that if the 
accounting information surrounding a firm is less precise and conceals economic performance, it 
can adversely affect the investment decisions of related firms. For example, Durnev and Mangen 
(2009) show that a firm’s past misreporting activities, as proxied by restatement announcements, 
affects competitors’ past investment decisions. Following prior literature, we use the magnitude 
of accruals relative to the magnitude of cash flows as a proxy for earnings management (Leuz et 
al. 2003; Barth et al. 2008; Hope et al. 2013). We calculate this measure as the absolute value of 
                                                 
21 Shroff et al. (2013) examine the overlap in monthly press release frequency between RavenPack and Factiva (an 
extensive press release database commonly used by researchers) for a random sample of 50 firms in the U.S. and 
find that the correlation in press-release frequency is 94.7% suggesting that the database is fairly comprehensive. 
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accruals scaled by the cash flow from operations for the median firm in each country-industry-
year. We multiply the measure by -1 and refer to it as earnings transparency for exposition. We 
use the quartile rank of country-industry each year as the final measure of IE.  
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive characteristics of the parents and foreign subsidiaries in 
our sample. Panel A shows the results for all firms. Untabulated results indicate that MNCs in 
our sample hold three foreign subsidiaries on average, which translates into 13.2 subsidiary-
years. The average investment rate among subsidiaries is 18% of assets and the average PE is 
19.6. The average asset size of subsidiaries in our sample is USD 24.9 million and the average 
subsidiary ROA is 3.3%. Untabulated descriptives show that the parents are much larger in size 
with average assets of USD 19.4 billion but they have a comparable mean ROA (3%). Panel A 
also shows that the average cash flow from operations (CFO) generated by parent firms is 8.6% 
of assets. The average ownership in its subsidiaries is 76.4%, which is partly driven by our 
sampling requirement that parents have at least 25% ownership interest in the entity for it to be 
included as a subsidiary. 
Table 3, Panel B presents the mean and standard deviation of PE and our proxies for IE 
by each country in our sample. The descriptive statistics are reported at the industry-year level 
(2,540 industry-years) in each country because we measure PE and IE at the industry level. The 
table shows that there is considerable variation in PE and in our IE measures within each country. 
For example, the average within-country standard deviation in analyst coverage (media 
coverage) for our sample of countries is 3.81 (1.56). This variation is important because our 
research design exploits only within-country variation in IE to explain INV–PE sensitivities. The 
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table also shows that there is considerable variation in the number of industry-year observations. 
In untabulated analyses, we find that our inferences are unchanged if we restrict our sample to 
include only countries with at least 15 industry-year observations. 
Regression Results: The Role of the Information Environment 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (1). In column 1, we present the 
baseline regression specification of INV on PE and control variables. To ease the interpretation 
of the coefficient for PE, this model excludes the interactions between the country fixed effects 
and PE. The table shows that the coefficient for PE is positive and statistically significant at the 
p<0.01 level (coef. = 0.06, t-stat = 2.85). This result confirms the findings in Bekaert et al. 
(2007) for our sample and suggests that firms’ investment decisions are associated with industry-
level PE ratios. In subsequent models, we control for the interaction between the country 
indicators and PE; therefore, the coefficient for PE is not directly interpretable as it captures the 
baseline relation between PE and INV in the country whose fixed effect is excluded from the 
regression. Therefore, we do not tabulate the coefficient for PE in our remaining analyses. 
Columns 2-4 in Table 4 show that the coefficient for the interaction between growth 
opportunities and information environment (PE × IE) is positive and statistically significant for 
all three measures of the information environment. Specifically, the coefficient for the interaction 
ranges from 0.19 to 0.23 and is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level or better. In economic 
terms, a one standard deviation increase in growth opportunities (which equals 17 in Table 3, 
Panel A) translates to approximately a 4% increase in investment for firms in the top analyst 
coverage quartile and a 1% increase for those in the bottom quartile. That is, there is 
approximately a 3% difference in investment between firms in the highest and lowest analyst 
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coverage quartile for a one standard deviation change in PE.22 Given that the average investment 
in our sample equals 18%, this represents a relative difference of approximately 17%. 
In the final column in Table 4, we aggregate our three IE proxies by taking the average of 
their ranks. This procedure helps reduce measurement errors in the individual proxies. Consistent 
with the results in the previous columns, we find that the coefficient for PE × IE is positive and 
statistically significant at the p<0.01 level.  Overall, the results presented in Table 4 indicate that 
the sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities is higher for subsidiaries located in country-
industries with more transparent information environments, consistent with H1. 
Table 4 also shows that the coefficients for ROA, Parent CFO, and Parent Ownership are 
consistently positive and statistically significant, indicating that better performing subsidiaries 
and subsidiaries whose parents have greater cash flows and ownership tend to invest more. 
Further, the coefficient for PE × Domestic Banking Credit is also positive and significant, 
indicating that the availability of bank financing increases the INV–PE sensitivity. Together, the 
coefficients for ROA and PE × Domestic Banking Credit suggest that financing constraints might 
be affecting subsidiaries’ investments and that the availability of bank financing helps to 
partially mitigate this constraint.  
Cross-Sectional Results 
Next, we examine our cross-sectional hypotheses, which predict differences in the 
importance of the role of the external information environment by (i) the level of cross-border 
frictions (H2) and (ii) the extent to which the parent is involved in the subsidiary’s investment 
decision-making process (H3).  
                                                 
22 Specifically, we obtain our estimate of economic significance by taking the product of the PE*IE coefficient, the 
standard deviation of PE, and the difference between the fourth and first quartiles of IE, where the quartile ranks are 
scaled by four. In numeric terms, this equals 0.23 × 17 × (1-0.25). 
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To test H2, we partition the sample into two groups based on the level of cross-border 
frictions between the parent and subsidiary and we estimate equation (1) separately for the two 
sub-samples. Following prior literature, we consider three proxies that capture cross-border 
frictions between the parent and subsidiary. The first proxy is based on the commonality of 
languages spoken in the parent’s and subsidiary’s countries. Sharing a common language reduces 
information asymmetry by reducing the transaction cost of exchanging information across 
borders. For example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that investors prefer to hold equities 
in firms that share the investor’s native tongue. Similarly, Di Giovanni (2005) examines cross-
border acquisitions and finds that sharing a common language helps reduce the cost of doing 
business across borders. If the parent and subsidiary are incorporated in countries that share a 
common official language, we consider cross-border frictions to be low.23  
Our second proxy for cross-border frictions is based on the geographic distance between 
the parent and subsidiary. Prior studies interpret geographic distance as a measure of information 
acquisition cost and/or information asymmetry (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2004). Consistent 
with this interpretation, prior research finds that geographic distance accounts for much of the 
variation in the cross-border flows of both real goods and financial assets (Portes and Rey 2005; 
Mian 2006). We measure Geographic Distance as the distance between the parent’s and 
subsidiary’s countries of incorporation. If the geographic distance between the parent country’s 
capital and the subsidiary country’s capital is greater than the median distance in our sample, we 
consider the cross-border frictions to be high. 
                                                 
23 An official language is defined as the primary and secondary language used in each country, according to the 
World Fact Book (CIA 2011). For example, English is a common official language shared by the U.S. and India, 
which facilitates communication between managers in these countries. However, China and the U.S. do not have a 
common official language, making bilateral communication more difficult. 
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Our final proxy for cross-border frictions is based on the difference in operating risks in 
the parent’s and the subsidiary’s country. Prior studies argue that operating risks such as 
infrastructure risks, customer risks, political risks, etc. are higher in emerging markets than in 
developed economies (Kwok and Reeb 2000).24 Thus, when MNCs from developed countries 
invest in emerging economies their operating risk increases although the reverse does not 
increase operating risk. In the context of our study, an increase in operating risks implies higher 
cross-border frictions. Thus, we predict that the role of the information environment will be 
stronger when parents from developed countries invest in emerging economies.25 We classify 
countries into developed and emerging markets following Kwok and Reeb (2000) and the 
International Monetary Fund’s 1999 Capital Market Report (see Table 2, Panel A). 
To better understand our cross-sectional tests, consider the following example.  Both Italy 
and the U.K. are resident to parent firms that have subsidiaries in Canada. However, unlike the 
U.K., Italy does not share a common official language with Canada. Therefore, cross-border 
frictions between Italian parents and their Canadian subsidiaries are higher than the frictions 
between the U.K. parents and their Canadian subsidiaries. Our prediction is that, holding the 
subsidiary’s location constant, the incremental INV–PE sensitivity due to higher IE in Canada is 
greater for subsidiaries owned by Italian parents than it is for the subsidiaries owned by U.K. 
parents. Therefore, this test compares the investment behavior of subsidiaries located in the same 
country and exploits variation in the parents’ locations, thereby mitigating concerns arising from 
cross-country differences in the investing/institutional environment, such as cross-country 
differences in financial development, corruption, growth opportunities, etc. 
                                                 
24 For example, infrastructure risk includes the increased risk of transportation delays due to fewer highways, 
railways, less developed air routes and greater susceptibility to route closures, as well as a greater risk of telephone 
and power outages and delays in mail delivery (Kwok and Reeb 2000). 
25 Following Kwok and Reeb (2000), we assume that the parent-subsidiary pairs operating within emerging (or 
developed) economies face similar operating risks and thus do not lead to increases in operating risk. 
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Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (1) on high and low cross-border 
friction partitions. Although we tabulate results using an aggregate of our three IE proxies, our 
inferences are unchanged when we use individual IE proxies. We find that when cross-border 
frictions are high, the coefficient for PE × IE is positive and significant. For instance, the 
coefficient for PE × IE is positive and statistically significant when the parent and subsidiary are 
located in countries that do not share a common language (coef.=0.55, t-stat=3.34), but 
statistically insignificant when parents and subsidiaries share a common language (coef.=-0.76, t-
stat=-1.27). The results using Geographic Distance and Operating Risk as proxies for cross-
border frictions offer similar inferences. We also test and find that the coefficients PE × IE are 
statistically different from each other for high versus low cross-border friction subsidiaries.26 
Overall, the results in Table 5 are consistent with H2 and suggest that the information 
environment has a greater effect on the sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities when 
there are greater cross-border frictions between the parent and the subsidiary. 
To test H3, we partition the sample based on the allocation of decision-making rights 
between the parent and subsidiary. Here again, we estimate equation (1) separately for the two 
sub-samples of subsidiaries classified based on the allocation of decision-making rights. We use 
three proxies to capture variation in the extent to which the parent is involved in the subsidiary’s 
investment decision-making process. Our first proxy is the subsidiary’s relative size based on 
total assets. Prior research finds that larger subsidiaries are more likely to have decision-making 
rights (Robinson and Stocken 2013). The size and scope of large subsidiaries makes it more 
difficult for managers at the parent firm to obtain and process all the information needed to 
                                                 
26 We test for the difference in coefficients using a bootstrap test. Specifically, we randomly assign the distance 
classification to each observation and estimate model (1) for the pseudo high and low distance groups, respectively. 
We then compute a pseudo difference in coefficients for the high and low distance pairs. Repeating this procedure 
1,000 times yields a null distribution of the difference in coefficients, which we use to test the significance of the 
difference in coefficients we report in Tables 5 and 6. 
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facilitate decision-making. Hence, decision-making in larger subsidiaries is more likely to be at 
the subsidiary level with less involvement from the parent. To measure a subsidiary’s relative 
size within each MNC, we sort subsidiaries into two groups based on their total assets. We 
classify subsidiaries with above median total assets relative to the assets of other subsidiaries 
owned by the same MNC as having a more autonomous decision-making process. 
Our second proxy exploits the nationality of the subsidiary’s management team and board 
members to identify the location of decision-making rights. These data are available in the 
ORBIS dataset. Parents are more likely to send expatriates to help manage the subsidiary when 
they wish to be involved in the subsidiary’s decision-making process. However, when local 
knowledge and relationships are important for decision-making, the subsidiary’s management 
team is more likely to be comprised of local managers who are native to the subsidiary’s country 
(Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010). Empirically, we classify subsidiaries whose management team has 
more (fewer) expatriates than the sample median as having higher (lower) parent firm 
involvement in the subsidiary’s decision-making processes.27  
Our final proxy for decision rights examines whether a subsidiary operates in the same 
industry as the parent firm. The international management literature shows that parents of MNCs 
are more likely to be involved in the subsidiary’s decision making process when they possess 
greater knowledge of the project (Björkman et al. 2004). Following prior research, we assume 
that parent firm managers’ are likely to possess greater knowledge of the subsidiary’s operations 
when the subsidiary operates in the same industry as the parent (Goodman et al. 2013). We use 
                                                 
27 Expatriates are defined as members of the management team whose nationality is different from the country 
where the subsidiary is domiciled. We obtain the nationality of the individual managers from ORBIS. The 
management team is defined as all senior managers, C-suite executives in operations and R&D, and the board of 
directors. 28% of the managers in our sample have missing data on nationality in ORBIS. While we drop these 
observations in our main analysis, untabulated results show that the findings are robust to assuming the managers 
with missing nationality information to be local managers. 
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the one-digit ICB code to classify the parent-subsidiary pairs into those operating in the same 
versus different industries. 
Table 6 presents these results. Consistent with H3, the coefficient for PE × IE is positive 
and significant for the sub-sample of subsidiaries with low decision-making rights, but 
insignificant and smaller in magnitude for the sub-sample of more autonomous subsidiaries. 
These results suggest that the role of the information environment in facilitating subsidiary 
investment is greater when parents are more involved in their subsidiary’s decision-making. 
Time Series Variation in the Information Environment 
Our main tests explore cross-sectional variation in the information environment. We now 
use IFRS adoption as a proxy for a time-series change in financial reporting standards that led to 
a significant change in the information environment. We then examine whether the investment 
decisions of subsidiaries located in IFRS-adopting countries improves following IFRS adoption. 
Prior research finds that voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with higher 
earnings “quality” (Barth et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2012) and a significant reduction in 
information asymmetry (e.g., Daske et al. 2008, 2013; Wahid and Yu 2013). Thus, IFRS 
adoption serves as another proxy for the richness of the external information environment, which 
complements the three measures we use in our main tests.  
We examine the change in INV–PE sensitivities for subsidiaries located in IFRS-adopting 
countries using a difference-in-differences design. In contrast to prior studies that focus on the 
firm adopting IFRS, we use IFRS adoption as an event that triggers a change in the external 
information environment. Thus, we consider both mandatory as well as voluntary adopters of 
IFRS when constructing our proxy for IFRS adoption. For our first proxy, we obtain from Daske 
et al. (2008) the list of countries that mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005 (with the exception of 
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Singapore which adopted IFRS in 2003) and include a dummy variable ‘Post 2005’ for sample 
years post 2005 in equation (1). In this model, we limit our sample to countries that have a low 
rate (<25%) of early voluntary adopters because, to the extent a significant number of firms 
voluntarily adopt IFRS before 2005, the mandatory adoption date is less likely to serve as a 
significant shift in the external information environment.28 For our second proxy, we include all 
IFRS-adopting countries but re-code the post-2005 variable to capture the percentage of firms 
adopting IFRS in a country over the sample period. For example, 26.4% to 36.1% of the firms in 
Germany voluntarily adopted IFRS between 2001 and 2004, before it was mandated in 2005. 
Therefore, we create a variable labeled ‘%IFRS’ that takes on values ranging from 0.264 to 0.361 
in the periods 2001 to 2004 and is set equal to 1 following mandatory adoption. We then focus 
on the difference in difference coefficient for countries with and without IFRS adoption (‘PE × 
Post 2005 × IFRS Country’ and ‘PE × %IFRS × IFRS Country’). Note that, because our model 
includes an interaction between PE and each country, the interaction between PE and IFRS 
Country is absorbed by the country-PE fixed effects. 
Table 7, column 1 presents the results after excluding subsidiaries located in countries 
with more than 25% of the firms voluntarily adopting IFRS and column 2 uses the proportion of 
IFRS-adopting firms in a country to proxy for the change in the external information 
environment. Column 1 shows that the coefficient for PE × Post 2005 × IFRS Country is positive 
and statistically significant (t-stat=1.86). The magnitude of the coefficient (0.25) is similar to 
what we report in column 4 suggesting that the change in the INV–PE sensitivity pre- vs. post-
IFRS is similar to the cross-sectional effect of our earlier proxies for the information 
environment. Column 2 presents the results with after considering a gradual change to IFRS. The 
                                                 
28 Specifically, we exclude Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, and Switzerland 
because more than 25% of the firms in these countries voluntarily adopted IFRS well before the mandatory adoption 
date. We obtain the rate of voluntary IFRS adoption from Daske et al. (2008). 
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coefficient for PE × %IFRS × IFRS Country is also positive and statistically significant (t-
stat=2.78) with a similar magnitude to that found in column 1. These results strengthen our 
inference that a richer external information environment facilitates the investment decisions of 
subsidiaries. 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Analyses of Benchmark Firms 
Our results thus far show that the local information environment is an important 
determinant of foreign subsidiaries’ investment efficiency. Further, our results are stronger when 
cross-border frictions are high and when parents are more actively involved in a subsidiary’s 
decision-making process. To further validate our inferences, we benchmark our findings for 
foreign subsidiaries to those obtained using two “placebo” samples where cross-border frictions 
are non-existent and the parent-subsidiary relationship is less applicable. First, we compare our 
findings for foreign subsidiaries to those for domestic subsidiaries of MNCs. Since domestic 
subsidiaries (as we define them) are located in the same country as the parent, cross-border 
frictions are absent. Second, we compare our findings for foreign subsidiaries to that for a 
matched sample of foreign standalone firms that operate in the same country-industry-year and 
are of similar size (measured using total assets) as the foreign subsidiary. The notion of parent-
subsidiary relationships do not apply to standalone firms and by definition, these firms do not 
suffer from cross-border frictions. Therefore, we predict that the local information environment 
has a smaller effect on the investment decisions of domestic subsidiaries and foreign standalone 
firms operating in the same countries as our foreign subsidiaries. 
We estimate equation (1) for the sample of domestic subsidiaries and a modified version 
of equation (1) for the sample of foreign standalone firms and compare these results with those 
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for foreign subsidiaries.29 Table 8 reports the results. To facilitate the comparison, we reproduce 
the results from Table 4 that estimate equation (1) for the sample of foreign subsidiaries. The 
results show that the interaction between growth opportunities and the information environment 
is not significant among domestic subsidiaries (column 2) and foreign standalone firms (column 
3). These results contrast with the positive and statistically significant coefficient for PE × IE for 
the sample of foreign subsidiaries. Further, the differences between the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. Overall, these results are consistent with our 
hypotheses that the external information environment is an important driver of investment 
efficiency, especially when cross-border frictions are high and when the parent firms demand 
information because of their involvement in the subsidiary’s investment decisions. 
Untabulated Robustness Tests 
We conduct two additional robustness tests tabulated and described in detail in an online 
appendix.30 First, we examine whether our results are robust to controlling for additional factors 
that drive the MNC’s initial decision to invest in a country. MNCs’ investment decisions can be 
separated into two distinct stages: (i) the decision to first enter a country and (ii) the decision to 
make ongoing investments conditional on entry. While our interest lies in the second stage, a 
potential concern with our tests is that our findings could simply reflect the role of transparency 
in the initial investment decision. More broadly, foreign investments made by MNCs are a subset 
of FDI flows into a country and thus it is conceivable that our results are capturing the 
determinants of FDI documented in prior research. While our main tests include a series of fixed 
                                                 
29 We modify equation (1) for standalone firms by removing control variables related to the parent-subsidiary 
relationship. Specifically, we are unable to control for Parent CFO, Parent Ownership and these variables interacted 
with PE. In addition, MNC indicator variables and parent-subsidiary pair indicator variables also do not apply. 
Finally, our sample size for standalone firms is smaller (31,957 observations) because we are unable to find a 
matching foreign subsidiary for some observations. In untabulated analyses, we find that our inferences from Table 
4 are identical with this different regression specification and smaller sub-sample of matched foreign subsidiaries. 
30 The online appendix can be downloaded here: http://www.mit.edu/~rverdi/. 
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effects that capture many of the determinants of FDI, we also re-run our tests controlling for 
additional time-varying drivers of FDI, such as the level of corruption (Alesina and Weder 2002), 
GDP growth, the currency exchange rate (Froot and Stein 1991), and the interest rate 
differentials between the parent’s and subsidiary’s countries (Gross and Trevino 1996). We find 
that our results are robust to addition of these control variables (see Table OA1 in the online 
appendix). 
Next, we examine whether our robust to using an alternative measure of investment 
efficiency – Total Factor Productivity (TFP). TFP is the portion of output not explained by the 
inputs used in a firm’s production and, therefore, measures how efficiently and intensely the 
inputs (capital and labor) are utilized in the production process (Schoar 2002). We find that TFP 
is positively associated with all our transparency proxies (see Table OA2 in the online appendix). 
These results suggest that our prior results on the relation between the information environment 
and the sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities manifest as higher productivity for 
subsidiaries located in more transparent information environments. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We test whether the external information environment in which subsidiaries operate helps 
MNCs monitor their subsidiaries’ investment decisions. Prior research emphasizes that cross-
border frictions lead to an increase in information frictions between parents and their subsidiaries, 
which creates a demand for information that parents can use to monitor and evaluate their 
subsidiaries. Based on this argument, we hypothesize that external information, such as that 
generated by other firms in the industry or by information intermediaries, can be used to enhance 
managerial investment decisions inside the firm.  
We find robust evidence that the sensitivity of subsidiary investment to growth 
opportunities is higher in country-industries with better information environments. Further, the 
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role of the information environment on the sensitivity of investment to growth opportunity is 
greater when i) there are greater cross-border frictions between the parent and the subsidiary and 
ii) when the parent is more involved in its subsidiary’s investment decision-making processes.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the real effects of accounting information. 
While recent research examines whether and why the quality of information disclosed by a firm 
affects the disclosing firm’s investment decisions, we examine the effects of firms’ disclosures 
and information intermediary coverage on the investment decisions of peer firms. Our paper also 
contributes to prior research on MNCs’ investment decisions and more broadly, the literature on 
foreign direct investments. MNCs are unique because they are subject to frictions arising from 
operating in many different countries. MNCs deal with these cross-border frictions by altering 
contract design, sharing ownership with local partners, etc. Our findings suggest that the external 
information environment is another mechanism that helps mitigate cross-border frictions. 
Our study exploits a novel dataset in the ownership structure of MNCs to provide 
preliminary evidence on the role of information in facilitating investment decisions in MNCs. 
While we have described limitations of this dataset, it provides an important opportunity to study 
MNC behavior. Our paper leaves open a number of subsequent research opportunities. For 
example, given our findings, one can examine the other types of internal governance 
mechanisms, such as compensation schemes, that MNCs use to mitigate cross-border friction, 
and how such internal mechanisms interact with the local environment in the country where the 
subsidiary operates. Finally, our study focuses only on the investment behavior of MNCs. Future 
research can extend this line of inquiry by examining other outcomes such as organizational 
design, incentive systems, and financing decisions. 
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Step 1: Identify parent companies from the ultimate owner1 dataset in ORBIS. 
 
Step 2: Link subsidiaries (Level 1) to the parent companies. We define 
subsidiaries as firms that are held with more than 25% direct ownership.2 We 
exclude firms that are indirectly held.3 
 
Step 3: Link subsidiaries (Level 2) to the Level 1 subsidiary companies. 
Repeat process for Level 3 and 4 subsidiaries. 
APPENDIX 
Linking Parent and Subsidiaries in ORBIS Database 
 
           
 
Parent-subsidiary dataset structure 
Parent Subsidiary Levels Ownership (%) 
P X 1 34% 
P Y 1 33% 
P A 2 34% (=34%*100%) 
P B 2 27% (=34%*80%) 
P C 2 15% (=34%*45%) 
P D 2 14% (=34%*40%) 
 
 
1 Ultimate owner: A firm where the shareholder with the highest direct ownership is an independent entity. To be an independent entity, the shareholder must be 
an individual or an entity with no shareholder owning more than 25% ownership. 
2 Direct ownership: ownership representing voting shares that are directly held.  
3 Indirect ownership: ownership representing voting shares that are held through an unknown entity. 
Parent 
company (P)
Ultimate 
Owner
Level 1 Subsidiaries
Company X Ultimate 
owner
Company Y Company Z
Direct ownership (%) 34% 33% ‐‐
Level 2 Subsidiaries
Company A Company B Company C Company D Company E
Direct ownership (%) 100% 80% 45% 40% Indirect ownership
Direct ownership
 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
This table presents our sample selection procedure. We require firm-years to have data on net income for both the 
parent and the subsidiary. In addition, we require both parents and subsidiaries to have at least USD 10,000 in 
assets and sales. 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
  
Observations 
Dropped 
# Parent-Subsidiary-Year 
Observations 
Parent - sub years with financials and industry codes   120,105 
Excluding subsidiaries that are financial holding companies 31,245 88,860 
Excluding subsidiaries located in country-industry-years with no 
PEs 22,938  65,922 
Excluding domestic subsidiaries 33,759   32,163 
Final MNC parent-subsidiary year   32,163 
 
 
Panel B: Firm-year observations 
    Main Sample 
Control 
Sample 
  
Foreign 
Subsidiaries 
Domestic 
Subsidiaries 
# of parent-subsidiary-years   32,163 33,759 
# of unique subsidiaries 6,298 6,019 
# of unique parents   2,249 1,091 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Composition by Country, Geographic Region, and Industry 
Panel A: Sample distribution by country 
Country 
Parent Subsidiary   
Country 
Parent Subsidiary 
# of obs  % of obs # of obs % of obs # of obs  % of obs # of obs  % of obs 
ARGENTINA (E) 2 0.0% 410 1.3% KUWAIT  49 0.2% 0 0.0% 
AUSTRALIA 330 1.0% 225 0.7% LIBERIA  2 0.0% 0 0.0% 
AUSTRIA 233 0.7% 30 0.1% LUXEMBOURG  100 0.3% 0 0.0% 
BELGIUM 304 0.9% 2,345 7.3% MALAYSIA (E) 62 0.2% 322 1.0% 
BERMUDA 149 0.5% 0 0.0% MARSHALL ISLANDS 7 0.0% 0 0.0% 
BRAZIL (E) 29 0.1% 55 0.2% MEXICO (E) 28 0.1% 9 0.0% 
CANADA 403 1.3% 131 0.4% NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 21 0.1% 0 0.0% 
CAYMAN ISLANDS 44 0.1% 0 0.0% NEW ZEALAND 42 0.1% 62 0.2% 
CHILE (E) 21 0.1% 0 0.0% NORWAY 470 1.5% 613 1.9% 
CHINA (E) 5 0.0% 992 3.1% PAKISTAN 5 0.0% 14 0.0% 
COLOMBIA (E) 0 0.0% 6 0.0% PERU (E) 3 0.0% 40 0.1% 
CROATIA 16 0.0% 0 0.0% PHILIPPINES (E) 0 0.0% 2 0.0% 
CYPRUS 36 0.1% 0 0.0% POLAND (E) 10 0.0% 810 2.5% 
CZECH REPUBLIC (E) 5 0.0% 225 0.7% PORTUGAL 37 0.1% 470 1.5% 
DENMARK 529 1.6% 0 0.0% ROMANIA 24 0.1% 81 0.3% 
EGYPT (E) 2 0.0% 0 0.0% RUSSIA 15 0.0% 0 0.0% 
FINLAND 717 2.2% 1,048 3.3% SINGAPORE (E) 157 0.5% 308 1.0% 
FRANCE 2,293 7.1% 5,164 16.1% SLOVAKIA 2 0.0% 0 0.0% 
GERMANY 2,068 6.4% 1,348 4.2% SLOVENIA 25 0.1% 0 0.0% 
GIBRALTAR 3 0.0% 0 0.0% SOUTH AFRICA (E) 99 0.3% 22 0.1% 
GREECE (E) 50 0.2% 411 1.3% SPAIN 624 1.9% 1,896 5.9% 
HONG KONG (E) 33 0.1% 9 0.0% SRI LANKA 6 0.0% 0 0.0% 
HUNGARY (E) 0 0.0% 5 0.0% SWEDEN 1,302 4.0% 1,635 5.1% 
ICELAND 12 0.0% 0 0.0% SWITZERLAND 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
INDIA (E) 262 0.8% 457 1.4% TAIWAN (E) 243 0.8% 0 0.0% 
INDONESIA (E) 0 0.0% 74 0.2% THAILAND (E) 2 0.0% 926 2.9% 
IRELAND 172 0.5% 161 0.5% TUNISIA 5 0.0% 0 0.0% 
ISRAEL 216 0.7% 9 0.0% TURKEY (E) 3 0.0% 29 0.1% 
ITALY 230 0.7% 2,525 7.9% UNITED KINGDOM 1,710 5.3% 6,824 21.2% 
JAMAICA 1 0.0% 0 0.0% UNITED STATES 12,108 37.6% 708 2.2% 
JAPAN 6,481 20.2% 485 1.5% VIRGIN ISLANDS 15 0.0% 0 0.0% 
KOREA(SOUTH) (E) 341 1.1% 1,276 4.0%   TOTAL 32,163 100% 32,163 100% 
43 
 
TABLE 2 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Parents and Subsidiaries by Geographic Region 
Parent\Subsidiary Africa 
South 
East 
Asia 
Middle 
East  
East 
Asia Oceania 
South 
America 
North 
America 
Eastern 
Europe 
Western 
Europe Total (# obs)  
Africa 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 3.7% 4.7% 0.0% 85.0% 107 
South East Asia 0.0% 16.2% 0.0% 9.7% 2.4% 0.0% 11.7% 1.0% 58.9% 494 
Middle East  0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 15.2% 3.2% 79.1% 282 
East Asia 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 15.0% 1.3% 0.7% 4.4% 4.6% 61.4% 7,103 
Oceania 0.0% 10.8% 0.0% 5.5% 4.5% 0.3% 9.0% 11.9% 58.0% 379 
South America 0.0% 3.2% 0.0% 5.4% 4.8% 10.6% 17.0% 8.7% 50.3% 312 
North America 0.1% 4.7% 0.1% 7.9% 0.8% 2.2% 1.2% 13.0% 69.9% 12,511 
Eastern Europe 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 3.4% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 40.4% 52.5% 3,289 
Western Europe 0.1% 5.4% 0.0% 6.6% 0.5% 1.8% 2.0% 19.3% 64.3% 7,686 
Total 22 2,103 9 2,762 287 520 839 4,857 20,764 32,163 
 
Panel A presents the distribution of both parent-year observations and subsidiary-year observations by country. (E) Denotes countries classified as 
emerging markets (following Kwok and Reeb 2000). Panel B presents the distribution of both parent-year observations (vertical axis) and 
subsidiary-year observations (horizontal axis) by geographic region. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Multinational Firms at the Subsidiary Level 
 
Panel A (B) in this table presents the firm-year-level (industry-year-level) descriptive statistics for the 
multinational firms in our sample (by country). Asset growth is the growth in assets for each subsidiary. PE is the 
price-to-earnings ratio for each subsidiary’s country-industry-year. Analyst coverage is the median number of 
analysts following firms in the country-industry-year. Press Coverage is the median number of press articles 
about firms in the country-industry-year, and Earnings Transparency is -1 times the absolute value of the ratio of 
accruals scaled by the cash flow from operations for the median firm in each country-industry-year. ROA is the 
return on assets, that is, net income by total assets, at the subsidiary level. Ln(Assets) is the natural log of assets 
at the subsidiary level. Parent CFO is the cash flows from operations scaled by total assets for each parent 
(based on the parent’s consolidated financial statements). Parent Ownership is the percentage of the subsidiary’s 
stock that is owned by the parent. For subsidiaries that are held indirectly through other firms, we use the product 
of all observed percentage ownership connecting the subsidiary along each chain. Domestic Banking Credit 
includes all credit provided domestically by the banking sector as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
Variable Mean Stdev. P25 P50 P75 N 
Number of Subsidiary-years per parent 13.15 18.73 4.00 7.00 15.00   2,249  
Asset Growth (%) 17.92 53.98 -7.64 9.18 28.18 32,163  
PE 19.63 17.00 11.35 15.65 21.25 32,163  
Analyst Coverage 1.30 0.47 1.06 1.23 1.45 32,163  
Press Coverage 0.51 0.29 0.25 0.50 0.75 32,163  
Earnings Transparency -0.61 0.28 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 32,163  
ROA (%) 3.32 23.92 -0.58 4.17 11.42 32,163  
Ln(Assets) 9.63 2.12 8.17 9.63 11.03 32,163  
Parent CFO (% of assets) 8.62 9.70 4.63 8.57 13.04 32,163  
Parent Ownership (%) 76.40 26.12 50.00 98.00 100.00 32,163  
Domestic Banking Credit (% of GDP) 130.30 47.24 33.74 80.78 105.71 32,163  
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Descriptives of PE and IE by country-industries 
  PE Analyst Coverage Press Coverage Earnings Transparency   
COUNTRY Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD N 
ARGENTINA 12.05 12.27 0.43 1.28 1.53 0.97 -1.46 0.87 83 
AUSTRALIA 19.97 13.87 0.14 0.35 2.34 1.15 -1.02 0.36 67 
AUSTRIA 22.79 24.38 3.37 6.27 3.05 2.03 -0.99 0.75 19 
BELGIUM 17.97 16.36 3.12 4.18 2.07 1.39 -0.99 0.42 117 
BRAZIL 25.86 29.93 1.33 2.40 1.99 1.35 -1.06 0.33 38 
CANADA 29.26 21.15 0.68 0.75 2.00 0.80 -0.93 0.41 60 
CHINA 38.91 21.73 0.00 0.00 1.92 0.77 -1.21 0.62 84 
COLOMBIA 49.77 53.45 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.26 -0.73 0.13 6 
CZECH REPUBLIC 37.88 44.55 0.74 1.83 1.35 0.74 -1.43 0.79 39 
FINLAND 18.70 14.50 5.03 4.32 2.76 1.95 -0.72 0.23 88 
FRANCE 17.24 12.04 0.98 1.83 2.74 1.67 -0.95 0.36 134 
GERMANY 20.18 17.17 1.03 1.91 2.17 1.20 -1.14 0.42 101 
GREECE 23.19 23.40 2.13 4.99 2.30 1.49 -1.17 0.34 79 
HONG KONG 22.48 5.61 0.00 0.00 1.56 0.53 -1.40 0.12 9 
HUNGARY 6.86 2.10 6.60 7.09 3.10 2.25 -1.51 1.00 5 
INDIA 23.01 18.75 0.88 1.79 1.73 0.87 -0.98 0.43 92 
INDONESIA 13.01 9.01 0.31 0.85 1.60 0.90 -1.64 0.62 36 
IRELAND 12.89 6.70 2.11 2.23 1.89 1.01 -1.20 0.87 46 
ISRAEL 10.28 7.88 0.00 0.00 1.71 0.76 -1.00 0.22 7 
ITALY 23.40 21.20 3.27 4.53 1.92 1.18 -1.13 0.41 119 
JAPAN 38.34 21.16 0.21 0.47 2.49 2.27 -0.94 0.15 92 
KOREA(SOUTH) 17.75 17.21 0.10 0.47 2.00 1.62 -1.15 0.52 111 
MALAYSIA 16.03 20.66 0.12 0.46 1.70 1.02 -1.59 0.52 82 
MEXICO 13.93 1.94 1.17 2.24 1.11 0.33 -1.70 0.37 9 
NEW ZEALAND 20.66 12.94 1.94 1.53 2.15 1.10 -0.99 0.56 27 
NORWAY 29.85 32.89 4.66 6.98 1.98 1.37 -1.12 0.62 59 
PAKISTAN 9.75 10.84 0.04 0.13 1.00 0.00 -0.88 0.63 14 
PERU 32.07 27.54 0.28 0.74 1.46 0.64 -0.93 0.43 25 
PHILIPPINES 11.10 0.21 0.00 0.00 2.25 0.35 -1.10 0.23 2 
POLAND 22.69 20.64 1.33 2.33 1.64 1.60 -1.46 0.90 89 
PORTUGAL 19.56 18.46 3.86 5.57 1.68 1.09 -1.24 0.91 74 
RUSSIA 22.54 23.90 2.48 3.00 1.61 0.75 -0.88 0.52 32 
SINGAPORE 20.46 23.74 1.24 3.68 1.51 0.63 -1.32 0.54 72 
SOUTH AFRICA 14.64 7.61 0.75 0.95 1.48 0.82 -0.82 0.44 22 
SPAIN 24.11 21.75 7.62 7.24 2.01 1.29 -0.87 0.42 128 
SWEDEN 20.74 20.18 2.02 3.94 2.53 1.54 -0.99 0.46 104 
SWITZERLAND 20.30 . 9.50 . 5.50 . -0.47 . 1 
THAILAND 17.76 17.55 0.41 0.94 2.30 1.66 -1.14 0.59 87 
TURKEY 19.46 16.65 0.48 1.50 1.27 0.57 -1.18 0.36 22 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 17.96 12.34 1.02 1.52 2.23 0.83 -1.00 0.49 144 
UNITED STATES 23.49 11.04 0.72 1.02 5.07 2.35 -1.09 0.38 115 
Total 21.84 20.37 1.79 3.81 2.18 1.56 -1.11 0.56 2,540 
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TABLE 4 
Investment Regressions Conditional on Information Environment 
 
This table presents the results from subsidiary-level regressions of asset growth on industry growth opportunities, the 
information environments in each country-industry-year, an interaction term between growth opportunities and the 
information environment and control variables. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio of the country-industry-year of the 
subsidiary. IE is the yearly quartile rank of our proxies for the information environment. We proxy for the information 
environment using the median number of analysts following firms in the country-industry-year (Analyst Coverage), 
the median number of press articles about firms in the country-industry-year (Press Coverage), and -1 times the 
absolute value of the ratio of accruals scaled by the cash flow from operations for the median firm in each country-
industry-year (Earnings Transparency). ROA is net income scaled by total assets. Log Assets is the natural log of the 
subsidiaries’ total assets. Parent CFO is the cash flows from operations obtained by the parent firm that owns the 
subsidiary. Parent Ownership is the percentage of the subsidiary’s stock that is owned by the parent. Domestic 
banking credit includes all credit provided domestically by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP. All regressions 
include the fixed effects of each parent firm, parent country-subsidiary country-pair, and the subsidiary’s ICB 
industry. The regressions also include interaction terms between each subsidiary-country indicator and PE. T-
Statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients and we cluster standard errors at the country-
industry level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Asset Growth 
Information Environment (IE) Measures 
Variables Pr. Sign   
Analyst 
Coverage 
Press 
Coverage 
Earnings 
Transparency Aggregate 
PE + 0.06*** 
 (2.85)     
PE × IE +   0.23*** 0.19** 0.23** 0.52*** 
      (3.11) (2.11) (1.97) (3.25) 
IE -0.14*** -0.05 -0.05 -0.18*** 
(-4.90) (-1.64) (-1.56) (-3.52) 
ROA 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 
(7.28) (11.33) (11.31) (11.33) (7.21) 
Log Assets -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
(-22.84) (-24.58) (-24.58) (-24.56) (-22.40) 
Parent CFO 0.33*** 0.14** 0.13** 0.13** 0.27*** 
(4.14) (2.41) (2.37) (2.39) (2.72) 
Parent Ownership 0.07*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 
(2.95) (2.03) (2.08) (2.17) (2.06) 
Domestic Banking Credit -0.25*** -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.35*** 
(-10.07) (-10.92) (-11.12) (-11.97) (-11.12) 
PE × Parent CFO  0.25  0.27  0.28  0.25  
(1.10) (1.16) (1.24) (1.11) 
PE × Parent Ownership 0.06  0.06  0.05  0.06  
(0.81) (0.79) (0.66) (0.80) 
PE × Domestic Banking Credit 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 
(6.03) (5.93) (6.74) (6.75) 
PE × Country Indicators No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PE × Firm-level Internal Mechanisms No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MNC Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Pairs Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustering (Country-Industry) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Firm-Years 32,163  32,163  32,163  32,163  32,163  
Adj. R-Square   13.2% 13.2% 13.1% 13.1% 13.2% 
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TABLE 5 
Investment Regressions by Cross-border Frictions between Parents and Subsidiaries 
 
This table presents the results from subsidiary-level regressions of asset growth on industry growth opportunities, the 
information environments in each country-industry-year, an interaction term between growth opportunities and the information 
environment and control variables. The regressions are partitioned into two groups based on the cross-border frictions between 
the parent and the subsidiary. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio of the country-industry-year of the subsidiary. IE is the yearly 
quartile rank of our proxies for the information environment. Common language is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
parent and subsidiary are incorporated in countries that share a common official language. Official language is defined as the 
primary and secondary languages used in each country, according to the World Fact Book (CIA, 2011). Geographic Distance 
is an indicator variable that equals one if the geographic distance between the parent’s and subsidiary’s countries is greater than 
the median distance for our sample firms. Operating Risk is an indicator variable that equals one if the parent is incorporated in 
a developed country and the subsidiary in an emerging market country. Developed countries are defined following Kwok and 
Reeb (2000). All other variables are as defined above Table 4. All regressions include the fixed effects of each parent firm, 
parent-country subsidiary-country pair, and the subsidiary’s ICB industry. The regressions also include interaction terms 
between each subsidiary-country indicator and PE. T-Statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
and we cluster standard errors at the country-industry level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the two tailed 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Asset Growth 
Distance Measures: Pr. Sign 
Common Language Geographic Distance Operating Risk 
Low 
Friction 
High 
Friction 
Low 
Friction 
High 
Friction 
Low 
Friction 
High 
Friction 
PE × IE ?/+ -0.76 0.55*** 0.33  0.68*** 0.44** 0.78* 
    (-1.27) (3.34) (1.50) (3.25) (2.52) (1.73) 
IE -0.07 -0.18*** -0.12** -0.23*** -0.17*** -0.10 
(-0.32) (-3.60) (-2.04) (-3.75) (-3.08) (-1.05) 
ROA 0.12** 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.34*** 0.28*** 0.70*** 
(2.26) (8.38) (3.82) (6.84) (6.84) (5.43) 
Log Assets -0.14*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 
(-8.68) (-22.33) (-10.20) (-17.68) (-19.95) (-6.52) 
Parent CFO (0.01) 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.20  0.23** 0.63*** 
(-0.03) (3.06) (2.94) (1.63) (2.20) (3.02) 
Parent Ownership -0.02 0.06** 0.04 0.08** 0.08** 0.04 
(-0.14) (2.07) (0.85) (2.12) (2.39) (0.48) 
Domestic Banking Credit -0.47*** -0.33*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.35*** -0.53*** 
(-7.15) (-8.16) (-7.16) (-10.48) (-11.00) (-3.07) 
PE × Parent CFO  0.57  0.23  0.21  0.34  0.38  -1.40*** 
(0.43) (0.97) (0.59) (1.17) (1.50) (-2.81) 
PE × Parent Ownership -0.29 0.05 -0.10 0.17* 0.04 0.10 
(-0.80) (0.69) (-0.80) (1.80) (0.47) (0.54) 
PE × Domestic Banking Credit 1.83*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.08  
(2.90) (5.67) (3.05) (6.71) (6.23) (0.16) 
Test (PE×IE): High = Low p-Value: 0.001 p-Value: 0.040 p-Value: 0.099 
PE × Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PE × Firm-level Internal Mechanisms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MNC Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Pairs Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustering (Country-Industry) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Firm-Years 4,088 28,075 12,380 19,783 27,557 4,606 
Adj. R-Square   17.0% 12.9% 13.9% 12.9% 12.9% 19.1% 
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TABLE 6 
Investment Regressions by Location of Decision Rights 
This table presents the results from subsidiary-level regressions of asset growth on industry growth opportunities, the 
information environments in each country-industry-year, an interaction term between growth opportunities and the 
information environment and control variables. The regressions are partitioned into two groups based on the location of 
decision rights between the parent and the subsidiary. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio of the country-industry-year of the 
subsidiary. IE is the yearly quartile rank of our proxies for the information environment. Relative Size is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the subsidiary is above the median size (measured using total assets) relative to the other subsidiaries 
owned by the same parent firm. Management Team Composition is an indicator variable that equals one if the subsidiary’s 
management team (i.e., all senior managers, C-suite executives in operations and R&D, and board of directors) has more 
expatriates than the sample median. Expatriates are defined as employees whose nationality differs from the country where 
the subsidiary is domiciled. Operating Industry is an indicator variable that equals one if the parent and the subsidiary operate 
in the same industry (one-digit ICB code). All other variables are as defined above Table 4. All regressions include the fixed 
effects of each parent firm, parent-country subsidiary-country pair, and the subsidiary’s ICB industry. The regressions also 
include interaction terms between each subsidiary-country indicator and PE. T-Statistics are reported in parentheses below 
the regression coefficients and we cluster standard errors at the country-industry level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the two tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Asset Growth 
Allocation of Decision Making 
Rights btw. Parent and Sub: 
Pr. 
Sign 
Relative Size Mgmt. Team Composition Operating Industry 
Low 
involve 
High 
involve 
Low 
involve 
High 
involve 
Low 
involve 
High 
involve 
PE × IE ?/+ 0.17 0.69*** 0.23  0.77*** 0.56** 0.73*** 
    (0.92) (3.02) (1.12) (3.90) (2.10) (3.23) 
IE -0.16** -0.16*** -0.08 -0.23*** -0.14* -0.26*** 
(-2.36) (-2.74) (-1.29) (-3.33) (-1.94) (-4.06) 
ROA 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.39*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 
(5.59) (5.55) (6.18) (5.74) (5.03) (6.21) 
Log Assets -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 
(-15.10) (-22.11) (-10.15) (-20.60) (-17.18) (-13.98) 
Parent CFO 0.19  0.23* 0.19  0.32** 0.30*** 0.25* 
(1.59) (1.66) (1.40) (2.42) (2.88) (1.79) 
Parent Ownership 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.07 
(1.57) (1.33) (0.73) (2.62) (2.72) (1.39) 
Domestic Banking Credit -0.31*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.39*** -0.35*** -0.36*** 
(-7.64) (-8.13) (-10.79) (-6.79) (-8.05) (-10.38) 
PE × Parent CFO  0.40  0.40  0.41  0.13  0.30  0.25  
(1.47) (1.07) (0.72) (0.46) (1.01) (0.69) 
PE × Parent Ownership -0.03 0.04 0.15 0.04 -0.10 0.19* 
(-0.24) (0.32) (0.91) (0.46) (-0.85) (1.69) 
PE × Domestic Banking Credit 0.60*** 0.66*** 0.88*** 0.83*** 0.69*** 0.87*** 
(4.75) (3.07) (5.44) (5.10) (3.83) (4.30) 
Test (PE×IE): High = Low p-Value: 0.03 p-Value: 0.05 p-Value: 0.14 
PE × Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PE × Firm-level Internal Mechanisms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MNC Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Pairs Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustering (Country-Industry) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Firm-Years 15,476 16,461 11,147 20,790 16,283 15,880 
Adj. R-Square   23.1% 23.4% 16.6% 12.4% 15.3% 13.4% 
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TABLE 7 
Using IFRS as a Shock to the Information Environment 
 
This table presents the results from subsidiary-level regressions of asset growth on industry growth opportunities, 
indicator variables for IFRS-adopting countries and the post-IFRS adoption years, an interaction term between growth 
opportunities and the IFRS indicator variables and control variables. IFRS Country is an indicator variable for all 
countries adopting IFRS. IFRS Proxy is either (i) Post 2005, which is an indicator variable for the calendar years after 
mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 or (ii) %IFRS, which is the proportion of firms adopting IFRS before its mandatory 
requirement (obtained from Daske et al. 2008). Following mandatory IFRS adoption, %IFRS is set equal to one for all 
observations. All other variables are as defined earlier (see Tables 3 and 4). T-Statistics are reported in parentheses below 
the regression coefficients and we cluster standard errors at the country-industry level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the two tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Asset Growth 
IFRS Proxy 
Variables Predicted Sign Post 2005 %IFRS 
PE × IFRS Proxy -0.12 -0.16* 
(-1.33) (-1.84) 
PE × IFRS Country 9.65 9.42 
(0.83) (0.83) 
PE × IFRS Proxy × IFRS Country + 0.25* 0.33***   
    (1.86) (2.78)   
IFRS Proxy × IFRS Country -0.08** 0.02 
(-2.34) (0.53) 
IFRS Proxy 0.01 0.04 
(0.45) (1.45) 
ROA 0.32*** 0.31*** 
(6.88) (7.23) 
Log Assets -0.07*** -0.07*** 
(-19.38) (-23.01) 
Parent CFO 0.23** 0.23** 
(2.08) (2.16) 
Parent Ownership 0.04 0.05 
(1.06) (1.64) 
Domestic Banking Credit -0.25*** -0.47*** 
(-5.93) (-10.00) 
PE × Parent CFO  0.44 0.31 
(1.23) (1.00) 
PE × Parent Ownership 0.20** 0.11 
(2.14) (1.13) 
PE × Domestic Banking Credit 0.53*** 0.44*** 
(3.35) (3.32) 
PE × Country Indicators Yes Yes 
PE × Firm-level Internal Mechanisms Yes Yes 
MNC Indicators Yes Yes 
Country Pairs Indicators Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
SE Clustering (Country-Industry) Yes Yes 
# Firm-Years 28,029  32,163  
Adj. R-Square   13.4% 13.3%   
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TABLE 8 
Using Domestic Subsidiaries and Foreign Stand-Alone Firms as Benchmark Groups 
 
This table presents the results from subsidiary-level regressions of asset growth on industry growth opportunities, 
the information environments in each country-industry-year, an interaction term between growth opportunities and 
the information environment and control variables. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio of the country-industry-year of 
the subsidiary. IE is the yearly quartile rank of our proxies for the information environment. We proxy for IE using 
the median number of analysts following firms in the country-industry-year (Analyst Coverage), the median number 
of press articles about firms in the country-industry-year (Press Coverage), and -1 times the absolute value of the 
ratio of accruals scaled by the cash flow from operations for the median firm in each country-industry-year 
(Earnings Transparency). The regressions are estimated using three samples: 1) the foreign subsidiaries of MNCs, 
2) the domestic subsidiaries of MNCs, and 3) foreign standalone firms that are matched to foreign subsidiaries on 
size, industry, country, and year. Domestic subsidiaries of MNCs are subsidiaries located in the same country as the 
parent. See Tables 3-5 for all variable definitions. T-Statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression 
coefficients and we cluster standard errors at the country-industry level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the two tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Asset Growth 
Benchmark Samples: Pr. Sign 
Foreign 
Subsidiaries 
(Table 4) 
Domestic 
Subsidiaries 
Matched Foreign 
Standalone Firms 
PE × IE +/0/0 0.52*** -0.13 -0.14 
    (3.25) (-0.73) (-0.57) 
IE -0.18*** -0.04 0.07 
  (-3.52) (-0.95) (0.98) 
ROA 0.31*** 0.57*** 0.36*** 
  (7.21) (9.28) (8.36) 
Log Assets -0.07*** -0.04*** 0.01** 
  (-22.40) (-12.08) (2.04) 
Parent CFO 0.27*** 0.61*** N/A   (2.72) (6.71) 
Parent Ownership 0.06** 0.04 N/A   (2.06) (1.53) 
Domestic Banking Credit -0.35*** -0.39*** (0.07) 
  (-11.12) (-9.35) (-1.29) 
PE × Parent CFO  0.25  0.00  N/A   (1.11) (-0.01) 
PE × Parent Ownership 0.06  0.16** N/A  (0.80) (2.10) 
PE × Domestic Banking Credit 0.71*** 0.92*** 0.74*** 
  (6.75) (5.51) (3.29) 
Test (PE×IE): Control Sample = Treatment Sample p-Value: 0.007 p-Value: 0.009 
PE × Country Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
PE × Firm-level internal mechanisms Yes Yes Yes 
MNC Indicators Yes Yes N/A 
Country Pairs Indicators Yes Yes N/A 
Country Indicators N/A N/A Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustering (Country-Industry) Yes Yes Yes 
# Firm-Years 32,163  33,759 31,957 
Adj. R-Square   13.2% 12.0% 9.9% 
 
